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ABSTRACT 
 
WILINGNESS TO INTERVENE: A STUDY ON DRONES, PUBLIC OPINION 
AND THE USE OF LETHAL ACTION 
 
Washburne, Samuel B. 
 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Paul Andrew Williams 
 
 
April 2015 
 
 
 
The U.S. military and the CIA have been using unmanned drone aircraft, in various 
ways, for the past two decades.  The CIA began using armed drones in 2002 to 
wreak havoc on Al-Qaeda and its operatives, primarily in Pakistan, Yemen, 
Afghanistan and Somalia.  However, the CIA’s targeted drone killing program was 
kept officially secret until President Obama admitted, indirectly, to its existence, in 
2013.  The U.S. public was effectively kept in the dark about this program for over 
a decade.  Recently, with growing public awareness of the use of drones, questions 
have been raised as to whether or not unmanned technologies in general – and 
drones in particular – have the potential to lower the threshold for the use of lethal 
force.  However, the literature surrounding this subject is limited.  This thesis aims 
to provide the reader with a detailed background regarding the evolution of the U.S. 
military drone program.  Moreover, it provides an analysis of the results from a 
public opinion survey I administered in 2014, in an attempt to discover what effect 
the use of military drones may have on a select sample from the Charlottesville and 
Albemarle area in the State of Virginia and the willingness to intervene militarily 
overseas.  
 
 
 
Keywords: U.S. Drone Program, U.S. Public Opinion, Public Opinion Survey. 
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ÖZET 
 
MÜDHALAE ETMEYE GÖNÜLLÜLÜK: İNSANSİZ HAVA ARACI, 
KAMUOYU, VE ÖLÜMCÜL EYLEM KULLANIMI ÜZERİNE BİR ÇALIŞMA 
 
 
Washburne, Samuel B. 
 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Paul Andrew Williams 
 
 
Nisan 2015 
 
 
ABD ordusu ve CIA, geçtiğimiz son yirmi yıldır çeşitli şekillerde insansız hava 
aracı kullanmaktadır. CIA, silahlı insansız hava araçlarını öncelikli olarak Pakistan, 
Yemen, Afganistan ve Somali’de faaliyet gösteren El Kaide’yi ve ajanlarını yok 
etmek amacıyla 2002 yılında kullanmaya başladı. Ancak CIA’in hedef gözeterek 
yok etme programı, 2013 yılında Başkan Obama, dolaylı olarak bu programın 
varlığını kabul edinceye kadar resmi olarak gizli tutuldu. Amerikan halkı, on yıldan 
daha uzun bir süre bu programdan haberdar edilmedi.  Son zamanlarda, insansız 
hava araçlarının kullanımı hakkında artan toplumsal bilinçle kafalarda, özellikle 
insansız hava araçları olmak üzere genel anlamda insansız teknolojilerin; öldürücü 
kuvvetin kullanım eşiğini düşürme potansiyelinin olup olmadığına dair soru 
işaretleri oluşmaya başladı. Ancak bu konudaki kaynaklar sınırlıdır. Bu tez, 
okuyucuya ABD askerî insansız hava aracı programının evrimiyle ilgili ayrıntılı bir 
alt yapı sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Ayrıca askerî insansız hava araçlarının 
kullanımının, Amerikalıların, deniz aşırı müdahalelere istekli olmaları konusunda 
nasıl bir etkisi olduğunu ortaya çıkarmak amacıyla 2014 yılında gerçekleştirdiğim 
bir kamuoyu araştırmasının sonuçlarının analizini de sunmaktadır. 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: ABD’nin İnsansız Hava Aracı Programı, ABD Kamuoyu, 
Kamuoyu Araştırması 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 The United States, its military and the CIA have been using armed unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly referred to as drones, for over a decade.  For the 
most part, the past two presidents, Bush and Obama, have viewed drone strikes as 
an effective tool for decimating Al-Qaeda’s network.  The United States has carried 
out hundreds of strikes that have resulted in thousands of deaths.  While some 
estimates put the civilian death toll from the strikes around 1,000, it is impossible to 
know any exact numbers (Fig 1).  Whatever the original intentions of the drone 
program were, targeted aerial killings rapidly became a favorite tool of President 
Bush and under President Obama, some argue, it has become his only foreign 
policy tool in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.  Yet, Obama’s extensive use of drones 
is logical.  He assumed the presidency in 2009 with a promise to end both wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and to bring U.S. soldiers back home whilst at the same time 
he restated the U.S.’ commitment to the global war on terror.  Yet, with a war-
weary American public that wanted and still wants to keep its soldiers out of harms 
way, how could Obama effectively conduct his global war on terror?  The answer: 
Drones.  Why drones? There are certainly a number of strategic, economic and 
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logistical reasons, but the one that will be discussed within this body of research lies 
in the realm of public opinion.    
 
 This first part of this study will aim to provide its audience with a detailed, 
concise background of the U.S. drone program as well as explain the history and 
important works of literature that have been written about public opinion, public 
opinion theory and public opinion polling.  Since the drone program remains 
shrouded in as much secrecy as the current administration can provide to it, there 
are a limited number of sources to draw from regarding its development.  However, 
even with almost everything being classified, authors, investigative journalists and 
think-tanks (as well as one speech by Obama himself about the program and a 
couple of interviews with John Brennan, former White House counterterrorism 
advisor and current Director of the CIA) provide enough information to paint a 
fairly clear portrait of the evolution of the drone program.  
 
 The second component of this study involves reviewing and analyzing the 
results of a public opinion poll that was administered in the summer of 2014 in and 
around Charlottesville, Virginia.  The purpose of this poll is to determine if the 
addition of drones to a military intervention would increase support for the 
intervention.  Major polling organizations have only recently begun administering 
U.S. public opinion polls with regards to the approval or disapproval of U.S. drone 
strikes.  Those that have been conducted by large polling institutions only have data 
from polls that generally date back to 2012.  One exception is the Pew Research 
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Center, which, prior to 2011, has no data regarding U.S. public opinion and drone 
strikes (Cohen 2014, 18). However, the polls that do exist show that the majority of 
Americans do support U.S. drone strikes, while the rest of the world, excluding 
Israel and Kenya, oppose them (Fig 2).  Moreover, there has been only one 
CBS/New York Times poll administered where support for airstrikes in Iraq was 
linked to the use of drones versus the use of manned aircraft.  While this poll did 
find that “…there is public support for using unmanned aircraft or drones to target 
militants in Iraq” and, more importantly, “there is less support for airstrikes using 
manned aircraft,” those responsible for this report understandably did not venture 
past making this distinction (CBS/NYT 2014).  My hope is that this thesis, with its 
original survey, designed to test an inchoate hypothesis that drone warfare and the 
U.S. drone program in particular, as the largest and first of its kind, have the 
potential for lowering the threshold of acceptance for lethal violence, will 
contribute to the general literature surrounding on drones. 
 
 Additionally, this thesis raises a number of other important questions that 
exist within the two-abovementioned components of this study.  If drones do have 
an influence over people’s opinions regarding intervention, does the global 
proliferation of drones mean we are destined for an era of more violence?  
Americans support the targeted killing program at the moment, but can we expect 
this collective acceptance of the program to change as outside pressures begin to 
build on the CIA to become more transparent?  Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, there currently exists no international legal framework governing the 
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use of drones by states outside of their sovereign territories.  In terms of 
international justification, the United States invokes the right to self-defense since 
al-Qaeda and its affiliates represent an imminent threat to the people and the 
government of the United States.  Nationally, the drone program receives its 
authorization from the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) signed 
by President Bush in 2001.  Moreover, the U.S. political doctrine regarding the 
program seems to be based solely on executive authority (with minimal 
congressional oversight).  Will Americans remain content in continuing to cede 
more authority the executive branch when it comes to decisions on war and lethal 
action?  These questions and many more must continue to be raised as the advent of 
drones into militaries around the world will only continue to increase the need for 
common understanding in order to avoid unintended consequences.   
 
 The survey itself was designed to be short, as it has only twelve questions, six 
of which are related to demographics (see Fig 3.)  One of the many arguments 
against the use of armed drones is that they make the decision to use lethal force, or 
to intervene militarily, much easier (BBC Online 2008).  This is due to many 
reasons, some of them being that there are fewer political controls (at least, in the 
United States this is especially the case), which increases the likelihood that drones 
will be used, and drones allow militaries to strike targets without risking the lives of 
any of their soldiers (Lee 2013). The questions refer to possible U.S. interventions 
in which drones would/would not be used, in hopes of assessing several potential 
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correlations, the most important of which relates the willingness of the respondents 
to intervene to the potential use/non-use of drones.  
  
1.1 Methodology 
 
 The answers offered for the first six questions, or “Likert items,” were based 
off a standard 7-point Likert scale.  A Likert item is simply a statement that the 
respondent is asked to evaluate according to any kind of subjective or objective 
criteria; generally the level of agreement or disagreement is measured (in this case, 
drones vs. soldiers and likelihood of agreement). It is considered symmetric or 
"balanced" because there are equal numbers of positive and negative positions.  As 
long as this 7-point scale is consistently used throughout the survey, one can 
assume that each response is equidistant from the next. This is important to 
understand because the seven options for each question – strongly disagree, 
somewhat disagree etc. – are given a corresponding number, 1-7, which 
theoretically makes it an ordinal scale, since the corresponding number could be 2-8 
or 3-9.  However, while there has been some debate over the ordinal/interval 
compatibility of Likert scales when using descriptive statistics to interpret the 
results (since technically an ordinal scale cannot be used to measure any 
correlation), strong arguments have been made that support interpreting the ordinal 
values assigned to options as interval data, which can then be analyzed using 
descriptive statistic techniques such as multiple regression analysis or cross-
tabulation (Brown 2011). 
 Finally, I attempted to incorporate pretesting into my survey.  This is 
important because I needed to test for the meaning (clarity) of the questions and 
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respondent interest in regards to my survey (i.e. the survey should not take longer 
than ten minutes) (Converse and Presser 1986, 54).  For “meaning,” I pretested to 
ensure that all aspects of each question are understood.  Is the vocabulary clear? 
Does the participant understand the question? Are the answer choices given 
clarifying or confusing?  While it is impossible to know if a potential participant is 
interested in my topic or not, there are some things that can be pretested in order to 
ensure that the survey will not reduce a respondent’s interest over the course of the 
survey.   I pretested to assess if the survey was too long, if the survey had an 
appropriate “flow” and whether or not the instructions were internally consistent 
(Converse and Presser 1986, 55-61).  
 
1.2 Limitations 
 
 I had considered an additional variable that would have been very useful in 
my analysis, but one that I was not able to incorporate into my survey.  I believe 
that the knowledge a participant has about the drone program could be a 
compounding factor in determining the outcome of the dependent variable (the 
support for drone usage).  However, in a short survey it is difficult to ascertain just 
what “level” of knowledge a participant has.  A simple question such as “how 
familiar are you with the drone program” might not ask enough.  However, if more 
specific questions were asked, to which only a very small number of the 
respondents knew the answer, it could lead one to believe that the majority of 
respondents had almost no knowledge of the program.  A “familiarity” question 
could be asked along with more specific questions, but if the answers did not match 
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up (e.g., a respondent says he or she is familiar but answers the more specific 
questions incorrectly), then I would have no real way of gauging the participant’s 
knowledge.  If I or another researcher chooses to expand on the research presented 
here, I would most certainly choose to add this element to the survey.  
   
1.3 Sample and Population 
 
 In order to keep the focus narrow and enhance the credibility of the survey 
findings, the target population chosen included Virginians living in either 
Albemarle Country or the City of Charlottesville.  This particular population was 
chosen because it is the only population that I could feasibly sample given my 
timeframe and resource constraints (Also, it is interesting to note that the City of 
Charlottesville was the first U.S. city to pass legislation banning the use of drones 
and it will therefore be interesting to see how residents feel about drone usage 
outside of the United States).  
 
 My sampling procedure involved a mix of snowball sampling and “taking 
what is readily available” (Stephan and McCarthy 1958, 44).  Snowball sampling is 
described as a “non-random” procedure, by which I used use my initial contacts to 
reach participants in my target population (Pierce 2008, 91).  In this case, I used 
local connections to put me in contact with local political party organizers.  This 
included Richard Brewer, the Chair of the Albemarle County Democratic 
Committee, Mike Basille, the President of the Jefferson Area Tea Party, Cindi 
Burket, Chairwoman of the Albemarle County Republican Committee, and C.J. 
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Hatcher along with Chardon Jenks, Chairwoman and Program chair, respectively, 
of the Albemarle County Republican Women’s League.  Through their efforts, I 
was able to reach out to a responsive audience that was arguably more interested in 
this topic than a random respondent might have been due to their involvement in a 
local political organization.   This was beneficial because one of the main concerns 
with a 7-point Likert scale is that allowing for the “neutral” option can be risky, 
especially in this case, where much of the information about the drone program is 
relatively new and general knowledge among the U.S. public about the U.S.’ use of 
drones overseas is somewhat low (Murray 2013). 
 
1.4 Sample and Population Limitations 
 
 The limitations here were considerable.  I did not have the time or resources 
to conduct a large survey and even with the population limitations I was still unable 
to reach the 1% threshold.  Yet, this would not seem to be a fatal flaw, since a 
“National Sample” is generally considered to be around one thousand respondents 
(Murray 2013) for a population of over three hundred million, and my target 
population is only around one hundred and fifty thousand.  A simple statistical 
analysis suffices to show whether a relationship exists between questions.  
Furthermore, multiple regression analysis will be used to determine which 
demographic variables, if any, shift in their statistical significance from question to 
question.  I cannot assert that my findings will be generalizable to any population 
outside of my target range and even generalizing within my target range may prove 
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difficult, which is why I will not focus on the explanatory power of the regression 
models but, rather, on any clear shifts in a variable’s influence within the models.   
 
As noted, the survey itself is short, with only twelve questions, half of them 
devoted to demographics.  As will be explained later, the questions were chosen to 
represent three different scenarios.  The positive side to this approach is it widens 
potential avenues for further research.  As we will see, different scenarios produce 
different results, which warrant further research into these areas. The drawback is, 
as mentioned above, that with only one question per scenario, the strength of the 
analyses suffers.   If the survey had been longer, more questions could have been 
devoted to each scenario.  However, I knew from the beginning that the survey 
would have to be kept short for practical reasons concerning the nature of its 
administration.  It was assumed early on in this project that random ‘cold-calling’ 
would be used.   I therefore believed that, in order to ensure the respondents’ 
willingness to continue with the survey, it needed to be kept short, as people are apt 
to hang up if they think the survey is too long; not to mention that getting someone 
to agree to take a survey via cold call is unlikely.  While these cold calls did not 
take place, the alternative option that presented itself also required me to keep the 
survey short.  As mentioned earlier, through the generosity of local party organizers 
I was able to attend political meetings from local Republicans, Democrats and Tea 
Partiers.  Since they were gracious enough to allow me to interrupt their 
proceedings, I wanted to keep my intrusion short. 
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The purpose of this project should be seen as an attempt to find out whether 
or not drones make it easier for people to choose intervention, or if drones, in fact, 
encourage use of lethal force to some degree.  If there seems to be a prevalent 
opinion, then my experiment could be expanded by another researcher who has 
funding.  If there does not seem to be a strong opinion, this is also an important 
finding that further research could review on a larger scale.  If I were able to find 
any correlations between my dependent and independent variable then this would 
only add to the potential need to expand this project.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE DRONE PROGRAM 
 
 
2.1 Brief Introduction to the Program 
Since the first drone strike in 2002 against suspected Al Qaeda members 
(Sifton 2012), the United States has conducted hundreds of other strikes in Somalia, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and even the Philippines.  For the most part, The Bush 
and Obama administrations were able to keep all elements of America’s drone 
program out of public view.  Each administration’s ability to keep the program 
secret for so long was due to a number of factors.  Generally, when a strike occured 
outside of a theater of war, such as Yemen or Pakistan, those countries would 
attribute it to their security forces and thus deny any U.S. involvement.  Likewise, 
the United States would also deny having any involvement as it did in the first 
strike in Yemen and the first strike in Pakistan in 2004 against Nek Muhammad 
(then a prominent Pashtun militant and leader of Pakistani Mujahideen in the tribal 
areas of Pakistan)(Mazzetti 2013: 108-10).  Furthermore, most of the strikes were 
carried out by the CIA, while a smaller number have been carried out by the highly 
secretive but now renowned Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), the same 
organization responsible for the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in 
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Abbottabad, Pakistan. The CIA is protected from disclosing any activities under 
Title 50 of the United States Code and JSOC is only required to report to Congress 
that ‘direct action’ occurred but no specifics (Zenko 2013). 
 
 Not surprisingly, public knowledge about drones over the past decade has 
been severely limited.  In fact, a study conducted by Monmouth University claims 
that 15% of Americans know ‘nothing at all’ and 25% know ‘just a little’ about 
America’s overseas drone program (Murray 2013).  The fact that the drone program 
was and continues to be a key instrument of Obama’s foreign policy is certainly 
interesting for a president who is a Democrat, but the lack of public knowledge, 
albeit through no fault of the public, is striking.  Yet, even with 40% of the public 
somewhat in the dark there have still been polls conducted regarding U.S. public 
opinion and drones. So far, the research that has been conducted on the drone 
program is very good but lacking in sufficient quantity, a characteristic that 
certainly applies to public opinion polls and the drone program.   !
2.2 Evolution of the Drone Program !
 One of the most important questions one has to ask when looking into public 
opinion about the drone program is, how did the U.S. clandestine drone program 
come into existence and how did the CIA – an institution that has traditionally been 
tasked with human intelligence and banned from political assassinations since 1976 
(CNN Law Center 2002) – end up controlling, for the most part, this targeted killing 
program?  Since 2001, a few investigative journalists have sought to trace the 
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origins and development of the program, and although much of the information has 
yet to be declassified, enough data exists to present the audience with a clear and 
understandable picture of what has been happening in this area. 
 
 The post-9/11 world brought about many changes in how the international 
community prevents and responds to terrorism. The most prominent changes 
occurred in the United States of America as the attacks unsettled the very social and 
political foundations of American society. National security seemed to become the 
one and only issue. Aside from the military interventions that followed, over 263 
different federal agencies were either created or reconfigured in the wake of the 
9/11, the defense budget was increased to over $500 billion per year, and now more 
than 1200 government organizations and over 1900 private companies conduct 
work related to counterterrorism (Villemez 2011).  
 
 Since 2001, national security has remained a key issue for Americans, 
alongside the unemployment rate and general health of the national economy (Pew 
Research Center [PRC] 2010).  The clearest manifestation of Americans' desire to 
bolster their national security apparatus came in the form of the Authorization for 
Use of Military Force (AUMF), which put the United States at war with any 
country where Al Qaeda may be operating (Mazzetti 2013: 77).  Previously the 
operations conducted by the United States military were large-scale and seemingly 
overt. However, post 9/11, alongside the very public invasions of Afghanistan and 
Iraq, core changes began occurring within the Pentagon and the CIA.  While the 
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invasions served their purposes, the Bush administration understood that Osama bin 
Laden and other Al Qaeda commanders did not operate in one area alone.  In order 
to track down, capture, and/or kill those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, the Bush 
administration believed it would have to adopt a global strategy one that allowed 
the United States to strike rapidly and effectively anywhere and anytime. However, 
this would require not only a secret army, but also a network of spies who could 
provide this army with reliable and actionable intelligence.   
 
 The intelligence failures that took place prior to 9/11 were embarrassing for 
all aspects of the American intelligence community, but particularly for the CIA, 
which had been tracking bin Laden since the 1990s.  One of the main issues in the 
hunt for bin Laden was timing.  President Clinton decided towards the end of his 
two terms in office to post two submarines armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles in 
the Arabian Sea in the hopes of receiving a reliable intelligence tip-off that could 
enable his officials to quickly approve a missile strike on bin Laden’s location 
(Mazzetti 2013: 89).  However, any intelligence gathered on bin Laden came too 
late for these strikes to be approved; to order such a strike, the President would have 
to know for certain that bin Laden would be where he was supposed to be when the 
missile reached its target.  The CIA broached many different ideas as to how they 
could find a reliable way to actually get rapid and real-time surveillance on bin 
Laden, rather than relying on relayed information from assets on the ground that 
always came too late (Mazzetti 2013: 90). 
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The United States military acquired drones in 1985 from Israeli Aircraft 
Industries and the drone, called ‘Pioneer’, was used in Operation Desert Storm 
(Michel 2013).  Later, having further developed drone technology, the MQ-1 
Predator was used by the CIA (Mazzetti 2013: 90-91) and the United States Air 
Force (USAF) during the Balkan wars to assist in military operations (Erhard 2010).  
Nevertheless, by 2000, the Predator drone was not that widely known within the 
U.S. military apparatus and intelligence community, nor was the idea of using the 
CIA to set up covert drone bases overseas in order to conduct real-time surveillance 
runs.  Yet, a few prescient officials did see the enormous potential that a clandestine 
drone program had to offer.  Richard Clarke served under both presidents George 
H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton as White House counterterrorism advisor.  Clarke was 
against the idea of ‘messy’ covert action because, as he said, “we’re not like that.  
We’re not Mossad” (Mazzetti 2013: 88). However, he did realize that when such a 
high value target, like bin Laden, presented itself, the United States needed to have 
an option to neutralize it, and neutralize it quickly.   
 
Clarke turned to Charles Allen, a senior CIA analyst who had served in the 
agency for over forty years (Mazzetti 2013: 90).  Allen consulted with the 
Department of Defense and through these consultations the idea of using a Predator 
drone for long-range surveillance came up (Mazzetti 2013: 90).  The ability to find, 
observe and track a target in real-time (or, slightly delayed time) would be an 
incredible leap forward in the realm of signal intelligence (SIGINT).  At this time, 
the Predator did not have the capacity to carry any type of weapon whatsoever, but 
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if a Predator were able to locate a target, then perhaps a cruise missile strike would 
be possible.  Allen brought his idea to Clarke, who called a White House meeting 
where he invited two other agency officials: Coffer Black, the chief of the CIA’s 
Counterterrorism Center (CTC) and Richard Blee, the head of the unit tasked with 
hunting bin Laden (Mazzetti 2013: 91).  Black, Blee and Allen convinced Clarke 
that a surveillance drone program was necessary and with the support of the White 
House, Allen managed to push through the initial opposition that was thrown up by 
CIA Director George Tenet and Deputy Director for Operations, James Pavitt.  
Predator surveillance flights over Afghanistan began in September 2000 (Mazzetti 
2013: 90). 
 
Sometime after the flights over Afghanistan began, a Predator managed to 
spot a truck convoy that CIA analysts believed to be carrying Osama bin Laden 
near a place called Tarnak Farms, a known home to bin Laden near Kandahar 
(Sifton 2012: 2).  With the supposed bin Laden on the screen, CIA officials quickly 
relayed the information to the White House in hopes that the submarines sitting in 
the Arabian Sea for some time would finally be put to their intended use.  However, 
as the White House officials informed those at the CIA watching bin Laden, it 
would take at least six hours to go through the launch protocols and there was no 
way of knowing whether bin Laden would actually be there when the missile struck 
(Mazzetti 2013: 93-94). The missile strike was not approved and less than a year 
later, the events of 9/11 took place.  The Predator would soon turn from an observer 
into a killer. 
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 Far from Afghanistan, engineers at Indian Springs Air Force Auxiliary Field 
were working to find a way to arm a drone.  Their testing had been accelerated at 
the request of the CIA, but most of the details behind the CIA’s request had been 
kept classified (Mazzetti 2013: 94). Within a matter of months the armed Predator 
was born, but debate was still ongoing within the CIA over the legality of such a 
weapon.  Aside from the obvious prohibition against the CIA carrying out 
assassinations, military operations were for the military, not the CIA.  Furthermore, 
as Mazzetti (2013: 99) writes, quoting Lt. General John Campbell, CIA’s Director 
of Military Support at the time: 
The CIA is different.  They have much less protection.  They can be 
operating under the provisions of a presidential finding where you 
get a piece of paper with the president’s signature that says, ‘I 
authorize you to do these things’.  Then, the next administration can 
come in and Justice decides that the finding was questionable and 
maybe even illegal—and guess what?—those guys are personally 
liable for the things they did. 
 
Yet, none of these concerns seemed to matter after 9/11.  The AUMF gave the CIA 
the authorization it needed to counter Al-Qaeda anytime, anywhere and by any 
means necessary.  As stated earlier, the first drone strike, conducted by the CIA 
alone, was conducted on February 4, 2002 in Afghanistan (Sifton 2012, 1).  The 
U.S. has since carried out five hundred targeted killings, 98% of which were drone 
strikes (Zenko 2014b). 
 
!
!
!
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2.2 Drones Under Obama !
 The drone program came to life under President George W. Bush, but only 
under President Obama did the program truly come to fruition.  Under Bush, fifty 
drone strikes occurred, while Obama has authorized the rest (over 450 and 
counting).  Obama, together with his counterterrorism advisor John Brennan (now 
CIA Director), turned the drone program and targeted killings into what some have 
argued to be his sole foreign policy vis-à-vis Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen.  For 
example, as Gregory Johnson, a leading expert on Yemen stated, “I don’t believe 
the U.S. has a Yemen policy.  What the U.S. has is a counterterrorism strategy that 
applies to Yemen” (Rohde 2012).  President Obama claims to be aware of this 
accusation and has insisted that, although he understands that drones can “lead a 
President and his team to view drone strikes as a cure-all for terrorism,” creating 
“reservoirs of goodwill” through foreign aid and “patiently supporting transitions to 
democracy…will serve as a rebuke to violent extremists” (Obama 2013).  
 
 Perhaps this is what President Obama would like to believe, because to say 
that a secret and seemingly interminable war against terrorists in multiple countries 
is the only available option, while at the same time attempting to follow through on 
a campaign promise to end both wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, is not necessarily the 
best trade-off, but, then again, drones have been effective to a certain degree.  As 
Daniel Byman (2013: 2) explains: 
 U.S. drones have killed an estimated 3,300 al Qaeda, Taliban and 
other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen.  That number 
includes over 50 senior leaders…Drones have also undercut 
terrorist’s ability to communicate and to train new recruits…Drones 
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have turned al Qaeda’s command and training structures into a 
liability, forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and 
risking dead leaders…Prosecuting detainees in a federal or military 
court is difficult because often the intelligence against terrorists is 
inadmissible…and given the fact that the United States is trying to 
close, rather than expand, the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba…It has become more politically palatable for the United 
States to kill rather than detain suspected terrorists. 
 
The CIA’s drone program under Obama has indubitably done irreparable damage to 
al-Qaeda’s global network.  It has allowed America to take its war on terror into the 
some of the most remote, dangerous regions of the world with absolutely zero risk 
to U.S. personnel.  The strikes themselves create less collateral damage than say a 
cruise missile strike or all-out assault by the Pakistani military into hostile territory 
at the request of the U.S.  Moreover, the governments of Pakistan and Yemen have 
made it quite clear that while they publicly decry the U.S.’s use of drones in their 
territory, they secretly give it their support.  After it became known that the U.S. 
was responsible for the very first drone strike in Yemen in 2002, the relations 
between the U.S. and Yemen soured a bit, but drone strikes began again in 2009 
under Obama and have continued since.  The Yemeni Parliament voted in 
December 2013 to ban drone strikes in a non-binding resolution (Almasmari 
2013a), but over a dozen U.S. drone strikes were carried out in 2014 alone (Bureau 
of Investigative Journalism [BIJ] 2014). Likewise, in response to a botched NATO 
airstrike in November 2011 that killed 25 Pakistani soldiers (Masood 2011), 
Pakistan’s parliament closed NATO supply routes, and demanded that the U.S. stop 
all drone strikes, and even forced the CIA to stop using Shamsi airfield to house its 
drones (Woods 2011); yet, the pause in strikes lasted only 55 days and on January 
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10, 2012 (BIJ 2011), the CIA carried out another strike inside Pakistan, and has 
since carried out nearly 100 more. 
 
 There is no denying that America’s increasing reliance on drones has been 
effective in many ways.  At a time where the Department of Defense (DoD) is 
looking to make up to $75 billion in spending cuts over the next two years, the use 
of drones in the military is likely to thrive due to how inexpensive it is compared to 
other programs (Department of Defense 2014). For example, the cost of the F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter program is estimated to reach almost $400 billion while the unit 
cost per jet is around $120 million (Oestergaard 2014). While the DoD does not 
plan to purchase any more F-15 Eagles in the coming years, it is allocating almost 
$800 million to the F-15 program over the next two years for Research, 
Development and Upgrade purposes (Oestergaard 2014).  Moreover, the operational 
cost of one F-15 is around $41,000/hr (Thompson 2013). When one compares these 
figures with the total cost of the MQ-9 Reaper program (the largest and most 
effective multi-role drone) at $10 billion, the cost per unit of approximately $14 
million (Oestergaard 2014) and the operational cost of $4,700/hr makes it less 
surprising that the U.S. Air Force is looking to expand its drone pilot force from 
1,300 to 1,650 by 2017 (Chow 2013) and that the Pentagon purchased 24 MQ-9 
Reaper drones (12 of which went to the Air Force) in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 
(Mead 2015) and will purchase 29 MQ-9 Reapers in FY 2016, all of which are for 
the Air Force alone (Gettinger 2015). The Army has requested 17 MQ-1C Gray 
Eagles (similar to the MQ-9 Reaper), the Navy and Marines will be getting three 
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long-endurance, high-altitude MQ-4C Tritons, at the cost of $549 million, and the 
Air Force will also be allocating $50 million to build another drone base in Agadez, 
Niger; and, of course, Research and Development for drones within each division of 
the U.S. Armed Forces will be boosted at varying levels (Gettinger 2015).  
 
 While there are many positives to using drones in the military, their full 
‘potential’ was realized first by the CIA and it is here where problems arise.  Critics 
of the drone program have presented a number of reasons as to why it should either 
be banned or fundamentally modified.  In terms of law, the U.S. government claims 
that targeted killings via drone strikes are legal both under international law, as 
these strikes represent the U.S.’ right to self-defense (albeit preemptive) under 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter (International Human Rights and Conflict 
Resolution Clinic 2012), and U.S. law, as authorized under the AUMF, which gave 
the U.S. the right to counter al-Qaeda and its affiliates anywhere in the world.  
Although the practice of “signature strikes” has apparently stopped (Gannon 2013), 
its prior use did put U.S. moral and legal justifications for the program on shakier 
ground.  The identities of individuals targeted by “signature strikes” were often 
unknown by the CIA, but they became viable targets because, after hours or days of 
being observed by a drone, analysts concluded that these persons exhibited 
suspicious patterns of behavior thought to be "signatures" of terrorists (Huffington 
2013).  Moreover, these vague parameters made acquiring the authorization to 
conduct ‘crowd killings’ – targeting groups of suspicious individuals instead of just 
one individual at a time – easier to justify (Klaidman 2012).  It does not take a legal 
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expert to understand that killing an individual, let alone a group of individuals, 
because they look like terrorists is hardly a defensible case and most likely resulted 
in the deaths of innocent Pakistanis.   
 
 Furthermore, although it is impossible to know how many terrorists the U.S. 
‘creates’ simply by using drones, blowback cannot be ignored.  The recent film, 
“Unmanned: America’s Drone Wars” (Greenwald 2013), documents how the drone 
program, according to the documentary’s producer and others in the film, is causing 
more harm than good.  Citing a specific case, Greenwald shows how in 2011 a 
Jirga, or an assembly of tribal elders called together in order to resolve a dispute, 
was targeted by a drone that resulted in the deaths of 42 people, including many of 
the elders responsible for holding their respective communities together.  It was a 
public event with many witnesses, who, after being interviewed, explained that they 
had no prior qualms with the United States, but after the strike vowed to take up 
arms against the United States.  In the film, Lawrence Wilkerson, a retired U.S. 
Army Colonel and the former Chief of Staff to Colin Powell, explains that, “the 
Vietnam body count as a metric was flawed. It did not really give you a measure of 
how successful you were being, in fact, it lead you astray in assessing that.  And the 
drone strikes are the same way.  They’re the wrong metric.  Tell me how we’re 
winning if every time we kill one we create ten?” (Greenwald 2013).  It is no secret 
that the drone program is extremely unpopular in Pakistan (Friedersdorf 2013) but a 
look at this Pew Research poll (See Figure 2) will explain just how unpopular the 
program is in general. The possible reasons for this unmistakably large contrast will 
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be discussed later but it is clear that the U.S. public is almost singularly alone in its 
support for the use of drones.   
 
 Finally, there are the issues of precedent and proliferation.  As of now, there 
are only three known countries that have used armed drones to authorize attacks 
outside their respective sovereign territories: the U.S.A., Israel, and the United 
Kingdom.  The U.S. is undoubtedly the leader in every category, from number of 
active drones to strikes carried out, people killed, etc.  However, it will not remain 
the unquestioned leader for much longer.  As many as 87 nations possess and use 
drones for surveillance purposes, and of those, 26 have either bought or are 
currently developing drones equivalent in size to the MQ-1 Reaper (Taylor 2013).  
Others, like Iran and China, are working hard to produce drones similar to the 
current most advanced U.S. hunter-killer drone, the MQ-9 Reaper (Taylor 2013).  
In fact, in a report by the Iranian Tasnim News Agency, Iran claims to have made 
an exact replica of a U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel drone, which was “brought down by the 
Iranian Armed Forces' electronic warfare unit which commandeered the aircraft and 
safely landed it."  It further adds that, “Iran managed to reverse engineer most parts 
of the drone” (Lendon 2014) though this claim has since been disputed.  In an 
apparent confirmation that these events did occur, President Obama actually asked 
for Iran to return the drone.  Moreover, America isn’t the only country capable of 
producing and selling drones.  Plenty of countries, including Russia, India and 
Germany have purchased Israeli drones and China is in the market as well.1 Even !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1Note: Please refer to New America Foundation section in the Appendix for a detailed list 
of countries’ drone capabilities/programs.  !
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non-state actors have acquired drones.  In fact, in one extraordinary case in 
September 2014, Hezbollah claims to have used an armed drone to strike (video 
included) what is believed to have been Al-Nusra’s headquarters in northern 
Lebanon, which claimed the lives of 23 alleged terrorists (JPost Staff 2014).  
Furthermore, claims have surfaced over the past several months that the Islamic 
State (IS) gained the use of some surveillance drones.  In an apparent confirmation 
of these claims, the U.S. Central Command confirmed that it had destroyed an IS 
drone during airstrikes between March 17th and 18th (United States Central 
Command 2015) 
 
 The U.S. is still considered the most powerful actor in the realm of drones, 
but that will change, and as Micah Zenko (2013a: 4), an expert on drones on the 
Council on Foreign Relations, explains: 
In this uncharted territory, U.S. policy provides a powerful 
precedent for other states and nonstate actors that will increasingly 
deploy drones with potentially dangerous ramifications. Reforming 
its practices could allow the United States to regain moral authority 
in dealings with other states and credibly engage with the 
international community to shape norms for responsible drone use.  
The current trajectory of U.S. drone strike policies is unsustainable. 
Without reform from within, drones risk becoming an unregulated, 
unaccountable vehicle for states to deploy lethal force with 
impunity. 
There is no question as to whether or not there will indeed be a global proliferation 
of drones; the drone industry itself is projected to be worth nearly $90 billion in the 
next ten years (Teal Group 2013).  There is little the United States can do that 
would allow it to retain its already deteriorating monopoly on drones, both armed 
and unarmed.  However, as Zenko and other critics have stated, there needs to be a 
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clear precedent, which would require more transparency so that regulations could 
be implemented and reviews of the U.S. program conducted, either by Congress or 
some other federal organization, and that is something the CIA is highly unlikely to 
embrace.  Both President Obama and CIA Director John Brennan are clearly aware 
of the delicate problem they face.  According to The Washington Post, both 
individuals were aware of the need for a manual or ‘playbook’ that would establish 
clear guidelines for targeted killing operations undertaken by the CIA (Miller et al. 
2013). That was near completion in January 2013 and some of the issues addressed 
in this ‘playbook’ “included the process for adding names to kill lists, the legal 
principles that govern when U.S. citizens can be targeted overseas and the sequence 
of approvals required when the CIA or U.S. military conducts drone strikes outside 
war zones” (Miller et al. 2013). Of course, one of the special conditions 
surrounding Obama’s approval of this second-term counterterrorism manual is that 
CIA drone strikes in Pakistan be exempt from these guidelines for up to the next 
two years (Miller et al. 2013). Yet, even with this manual, the question still 
remains: can a clear precedent be set by the CIA – an organization that by its very 
nature is unable or unwilling to disclose anything about its practices – so that the 
international community is less likely to abuse its ability to use armed drones when 
the times comes?  Many are of the opinion that drone operations should be in the 
hands of the U.S. military, which brings us to the potential future of the U.S. drone 
program. 
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2.3 Future of the Drone Program 
 
 George W. Bush’s Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was first 
introduced to the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in 2001 and was 
apparently mesmerized by the show put on by the Delta Force operatives and Navy 
SEALs, of which units JSOC was comprised (Mazzetti 2013: 63).  As Mazzetti 
(2013: 75-76) describes: 
Rumsfeld saw the appeal in JSOC’s independence. It could be a 
strike force answering directly to the Defense Secretary and the 
president, not under the control of some four-star general worried 
about his turf…If Rumsfeld could throw money at the command, 
allowing Delta Force and SEAL team six to enlarge their ranks and 
buy enough equipment for lengthy overseas deployments, he 
figured he could send it virtually anywhere. 
 
Since the AUMF gave Rumsfeld the ability to operate essentially anywhere, all he 
had to do was wait until JSOC was fully operational.  During that time, it is hard to 
imagine that Rumsfeld envisioned JSOC running America’s drone program, as he 
was more interested in turning this highly secretive component of America’s 
military into a number of global counterterrorism squads.  Yet, with the 
increasingly asymmetrical nature of warfare in which the U.S. and its allies have 
become involved, it may now make more sense to combine America’s two 
asymmetrical responses (JSOC’s special forces and the CIA’s drones) to this 
challenge under the roof of one organization, the JSOC.  Moreover, JSOC is not 
unfamiliar with operating drones.  While the CIA conducts most of the drone strikes 
carried out in Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan, it is important to understand that 
JSOC is also responsible for carrying out a number of its own strikes (Dilanian 
2014). 
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 The desire to shift the drone program from the CIA to the U.S. military was 
articulated in 2013 after a wave of scrutiny focused on Obama and his 
administration for its lack of transparency surrounding the drone program (Dilanian 
2013).  In response, during his speech in May 2013 at the National Defense 
University, President Obama explained that he also believes the drone program 
should shift to the Pentagon to allow, among other things, more transparency 
(Klaidman 2013).  Moreover, current CIA Director, John Brennan, also believes 
that the CIA “should not be doing traditional military activities and operations” 
(Miller 2013).  This was a serious statement from the man who is considered to be 
the one who pushed for heavier reliance on the CIA’s drone program as Obama’s 
previous counterterrorism advisor in 2009-2013, a period during which the most 
drone strikes occurred killing some 1,500 people in Pakistan alone. (BIJ 2014b) 
Senator John McCain also believes that the “the majority of it [the drone program] 
can be conducted by the Department of Defense (Schmitt 2014), while Rep. Adam 
Schiff (D-Calif) says that the efforts to shift the C.I.A’s lethal drone operations into 
the hands of the DoD represent a “goal broadly shared within the administration” 
(Miller 2013). 
  
 Yet, obstacles remain.  It has been almost two years since Obama and 
Brennan both expressed their desire to shift the CIA drone program and so far no 
progress has occurred.  This is because Congress, in an unusually direct way, added 
a clause to the federal budget plan that would restrict any attempt to transfer the 
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program outside of the CIA (Auner 2014).  A major reason for this congressional 
obstacle could be that that some inside Congress, including influential Senator 
Dianne Feinstein, who was, until recently, the Chairwoman of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, believe JSOC cannot be trusted with the program.  As 
stated earlier, JSOC may have some experience with drones, but mistakes have also 
been made.  This mistrust could stem from a botched JSOC drone strike in Yemen 
on December 12, 2013, where at least six innocent people in a wedding convoy 
were killed (Schmitt 2014).  U.S. military officials maintain that no civilians were 
killed in this strike, but “U.S. officials have said that both the CIA and the National 
Counterterrorism Center, which was directed by the White House to review the 
operation, concluded that civilians were probably injured or killed” (Miller 2014).  
The fact that the CIA chose to contradict JSOC’s version of events regarding this 
strike could mean that Brennan may have had second thoughts about parting with a 
program with which he has so closely associated himself.  Furthermore, the victims 
of this strike were paid a total of around $1 million ($60,000 each), which, 
according to one expert, was unlikely to have been financed by the Yemeni 
government alone (Miller 2014).  Yemen suspended JSOC’s ability to carry out 
airstrikes in Yemen, which the U.S. has abided by so far. 
 
 It could be that the CIA has simply become too adept at its drone operations 
for Obama, Brennan or Congress to consider moving it elsewhere.  One 
congressional aide stated that “The amount of time that goes into a strike package at 
CIA is longer and more detailed than a strike package put together at the Defense 
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Department" and that “Their standards of who is a combatant are different. 
Standards for collateral damage are different” (Dilanian 2014).  It has been nearly 
19 months since Obama mentioned the proposed ‘shift’ to the Pentagon, with no 
real developments to speak of occurring since then.  It would be more prudent to 
assume that Obama’s speech at NDU and the subsequent interviews given by John 
Brennan about the drone program (Reid 2013) were crafted in a way to deflect 
criticism by openly acknowledging the drone program (which may seem to some as 
‘being more transparent’), defending it and then promising more transparency 
through this proposed ‘shift’ to the Pentagon.  However, even if the program were 
transferred away from the CIA, the supposed transparency that would follow is 
minimal at best.  As stated earlier, even though the U.S. military, including its 
highly secretive JSOC component, are governed by rules that require it to report to 
Congress, the extent to which JSOC informs Congress of its operations amounts to 
acknowledging ‘direct actions’ that occur, but never with any specifics (Zenko 
2013a: 8). For the time being, it appears as though America’s drone program will 
remain under the control of John Brennan and the CIA and it will most likely 
remain so until the end of Obama’s term.  Moreover, it would not be surprising if it 
remained so under the next president’s watch. 
 
 In regards to the question of lethal action and the President’s willingness to 
use it, his drone campaign paints an easily discernible pattern.  Obama's desire to 
back the drone program began almost immediately with his war on terror. Over his 
two terms in office, drone attacks grew beyond anything imagined by the Bush 
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administration. In December 2009, less than a year after taking office, Obama 
accepted the Nobel Peace Prize.  By this point, he had also authorized more drone 
strikes than George W. Bush had approved during his entire presidency (Klaidman 
2012) and by now he has set a record that no President may ever match.  The head 
of the CTC told the Washington Post in 2011,  "We're killing these sons of bitches 
faster than they can grow them" (Klaidman 2012).  Although Obama is not the first 
President to authorize drone strikes overseas, he is the first to do so in such an 
aggressive and unrestricted manner.  Numbers do not lie.  For Obama, drones made 
the choice to pursue lethal action against known or supposed threats much easier to 
make.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 PUBLIC OPINION 
!
!
3.1 The Concept of Public Opinion 
 Although it is not the intent of this work to make any new conclusions or 
attempt to critique or discredit existing theories on public opinion, it is necessary 
that the audience understand some of the most important debates and ideas that 
have taken place in the U.S. throughout the 20th and into the 21st century (though 
the term ‘public opinion’ was coined in the 18th century)(Habermas 1989).  The 
nature of public opinion along with the multiple theories that surround it and the 
complex methods used for testing it make it a difficult subject to fully grasp.  This 
is mostly due to the fact that, as a subject, public opinion scholars, analysts, 
pollsters etc, attempt to quantify humans’ attitudes, behaviors and/or preferences 
towards, essentially, an infinite number of options.  Fortunately, in the United 
States, public opinion is a subject that has received a significant amount of attention 
over the past one hundred years, which should come as no surprise, as the very 
foundation of the United States rests upon democratic principles and ‘public 
opinion’ is considered to embody the voice of the people.  Public opinion regarding 
!! 32!
certain issues does exist and is quantifiable to an extent; however, the question that 
theorists and scholars continue to debate over is just how influential U.S. public 
opinion is on politicians and policy formation; specifically, foreign policy.  
 
 While it is commonplace to use the term today, the very idea of ‘public 
opinion’ did not fully come into existence until the Age of the Enlightenment.  
Rousseau was the first to actually use the word opinion publique, albeit not in the 
same sense it is used today as the term opinion was originally understood as 
something that was uncertain, uncritical and lacking reason or devoid of critical 
thought (Habermas 1989: 92-93). Shortly thereafter Edmund Burke proclaimed that 
there was such a thing as ‘general opinion’ that existed in society, albeit in the 
societies’ of free countries, where “the opinion of the public that put its reason to 
use was no longer just opinion; it did not arise from mere inclination but from 
private reflection upon public affairs and from their public discussion” (Habermas 
1989: 94).  The term ‘public opinion’ came to mean the result of deliberations and 
discussions of an enlightened public about the nature of the current social order.  As 
Habermas (1989: 96) explains, “it [public opinion] did not rule, but the enlightened 
ruler would have to follow its insight.”  Though many would be hesitant to name 
the U.S. president a ‘ruler’ rather than a ‘leader,’ we experience a similar 
phenomenon today in the U.S.  The President, along with other elected officials, has 
a campaign team within which a division exists for the sole purpose of testing the 
public’s opinion about a variety of issues from social to economic to foreign.   
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 Yet, the liberalist/pluralist notion that the public is capable of holding an 
opinion or sets of opinions that are measurable, rational and stable, and that it is in 
each respective leader’s best interest to take these opinions into account when 
making decisions, was not immediately accepted into mainstream thought and 
academia.  There was and remains a realist opposition composed of those who 
believe that the majority of the public is incapable of possessing either the 
intellectual fortitude or attentiveness to matters outside the realm of one’s self that 
is necessary for the formation of an informed, rational opinion.  The realist side of 
the debate sees the public as capricious, emotional and, at times, dangerous.  Even 
the founding fathers of the United States shared the concerns that public opinion is 
apt to fluctuate and be susceptible to delusions, which is why Madison, Hamilton 
and others thought to constrain popular sovereignty (Page and Shapiro 1992: 3).  
Although the more liberal side of this debate made significant headway in proving 
the importance of public opinion in the United States, both sides continue to battle.  
However, public opinion itself is too broad a topic for the purposes of this work.  
Since U.S. military drones are a foreign policy issue, it would be prudent to 
understand the effect of U.S. public opinion on U.S. foreign policy.    
 
3.2 Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy 
 
 Here, the debate between realists and liberals over public opinion continues 
with similar, but more specific arguments.  Theorists and scholars have continued to 
disagree over the role that the public, especially the U.S. public, plays in the foreign 
policy decision-making process.  For the most part, liberals have argued that in 
democracies, where the public has a significant role, leaders are restrained from 
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being overly combative and more peaceful policies prevail.  These claims rest on 
Kant’s theory of ‘democratic peace,’ which argues that republics are more likely to 
avoid war than non-republics since those who have a choice would much rather 
avoid destruction and death (Holsti 2004: 4).  Jeremy Bentham, Rousseau and 
James Mill also championed the liberalist approach by advocating the importance of 
the people and their opinions on foreign affairs.  Their view was that diplomacy 
conducted in secret and dependent on the whims of leaders was ineffective and 
dangerous.   
 
 However, on the other side of this debate realists argue that the public is 
generally uninformed, emotional and irrational when it comes to foreign policy 
(Holsti 1992: 440).  It would be much better, realists argue, for the public to focus 
on local issues and leave the foreign policy to the better informed, more rational 
state representatives.  For realists who are governed by a ‘balance-of-power’ 
mentality, trying to explain to the public why alliances with brutal dictatorships are 
necessary because they preserve national interests is a waste of time and the public 
will most likely remain unable to understand the relationship as a means to an end 
rather than an end (Holsti 2004: 6). Realists are very skeptical of public opinion and 
view it more as a hindrance than anything else when it comes to formulating foreign 
policy.  As stated earlier, even Alexander Hamilton held similar pessimistic views 
about the involvement of the American public in policy making and when it came 
to foreign affairs he believed the senate could act as a “defense to the people against 
their own temporary errors and delusions (Holsti 2004: 6). 
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 The debate surrounding public opinion generally fluctuates according to the 
existence and degree of conflict. World War I, which was the first so-called ‘public 
relations war,’ provided an outlet for both sides to argue their point (Holsti 1992: 
440).  President Wilson was seen as a champion of the liberal cause who believed 
that the war was the result of secret diplomacy and an uninformed public.  During 
the war, Wilson stated that, “the counsels of plain men have become on all hands 
more simple and straightforward and more unified than the counsels of 
sophisticated men of affairs…That is why I have said that this is a people’s war, not 
a statesman’s.  Statesmen must follow the clarified common thought or be broken” 
(Holsti 2004: 10). Yet, even with a President so outspoken about the role of public 
opinion, not all shared Wilson’s views.  Journalist Walter Lippmann, who was first 
the assistant to the Secretary of War, published works in which he claimed that the 
gap between the average citizen and foreign affairs could not be reconciled 
(Lippmann as cited in Holsti 1992: 440-1).  He seriously doubted whether or not the 
average citizen could make any contribution to the realm of foreign affairs because 
a citizen is generally far removed it.  He believed that the average person was more 
concerned with daily life and even if he or she did devote some attention to foreign 
affairs the information they would get would be incorrect or distorted.   Lippmann 
greatly distrusted the ability of the media to accurately portray international 
happenings and argued that even the widely read, highly regarded New York Times 
produced stories that were very misleading (Holsti 2004: 13).  The inability of the 
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U.S. and Allied Powers to stop German aggression due to the isolationist backlash 
that WWI produced put the realists and skeptics at the forefront of the debate.  
 
 In the years leading up to World War II and ever since, the opinion poll, most 
notably as introduced by George Gallup, became an empirical method for testing 
public opinion.  After having correctly predicted the 1936 election when another 
poll, one that was administered by Literary Digest incorrectly forecasted that Alf 
Landon would win, Gallup’s method of using a more representative sample rather 
than simply more participants (Literary Digest’s poll claimed to have sent out 
nearly ten million ballots) proved to be the more reliable scientific polling method 
(Holsti 2004: 15).  Gallup’s polls throughout the 30s showed that the U.S. public 
was still very much against U.S. involvement in Europe and that up until Pearl 
Harbor the overall sentiment was an isolationist one.  The sudden American shift 
towards intervention was certainly understandable after the Pearl Harbor attack but 
many, including Roosevelt, worried that it would slip back towards isolationist 
preferences.  Many others who, after WWII, had a very unfavorable view of 
American public opinion shared this concern and also became skeptical of just how 
‘scientific’ the poll was itself (Holsti 2004: 25).  In the aftermath of WWII, Gabriel 
Almond produced a similar but more damning argument (Almond 1950 as cited in 
Holsti 1992: 442) of public opinion and together with Lippmann’s skepticism it led 
to the ‘Almond-Lippmann consensus’ or the ‘post-WWII consensus’: U.S. public 
opinion is highly volatile, incoherent and has essentially little impact on a leader’s 
decision (Holsti 1992: 442).  
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 This consensus would remain in place until the Vietnam War, when even 
Walter Lippmann, who strongly believed in a powerful executive to combat the 
capriciousness of the public, became a severe critic of President Johnson’s handling 
of the war (Holsti 2004: 41).  It was during this era that scholars and pollsters 
increased their secondary analysis of Gallup polls and became more critical of their 
ability to measure opinion because their questions were too simple and did not offer 
the respondent a chance to thoroughly express his or her opinion (Holsti 2004: 42).  
In order to combat this perceived lack of precision, more independent polls 
appeared that focused on specific policies rather than broad, over-generalized 
questions such as “do you support the current American policy regarding country 
x?”  The Verba-Stanford studies, for example, provided evidence of support for 
some of Johnson’s policies in Vietnam but also support for other alternative ones 
(Holsti 2004: 42).  
 
 The ‘Almond-Lippmann’ consensus began to lose ground following Vietnam 
and more scholars began to view the public as more rational and less whimsical 
than it had previously been portrayed.  In fact, one of the biggest foundations of the 
‘Almond-Lippmann’ consensus was that the American public was fickle in regard 
to being either isolationist or interventionist, yet, since 1942 and until 2013 no 
major survey (Gallup, Harris, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, etc.) recorded 
a number higher than 40% of respondents who believed it was better to stay out of 
international affairs (Holsti 2004: 45).  Moreover, in their landmark work on public 
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opinion, Shapiro and Page found that since the 1930s and through the 1980s, 
“American’s collective policy preferences are real, knowable, differentiated, 
patterned and coherent” (Page and Shapiro 1992: 383).  Page and Shapiro (1992: 
16) argue that collective public opinion is rational and stable. Individuals may be 
ignorant or their answers may change from one day to the next depending on how 
much new information they are exposed to about a certain topic, but if they change 
randomly over a period of time then we can discover that a person will show a long-
term preference or a central tendency of opinion. Because of this, at any given 
moment Page and Shapiro (Page and Shapiro 1992, 17) argue: 
…the random deviations of individuals from their long-term 
opinions may well cancel out over a large sample, so that a poll or 
survey can accurately measure collective preferences as defined in 
terms of the true or long term preferences of many individual 
citizens.  
 
 Public opinion is important, it does matter and it is measurable.  Individually, 
Americans’ views on the drone program may change each month depending on 
their level of interest and response to new information.  However, collectively 
Americans continue to approve of the drone program and that is an important 
distinction (Drake 2013).   
 In my research, I will look to uncover both individual and collective attitudes 
surrounding my research question.  Are Americans’ decisions regarding overseas 
military intervention influenced outright when drone are used to augment a military 
force? What if the force is only comprised of drones?  Moreover, if there is an 
influence exerted, how strong is it?  Furthermore, although the sample size is small, 
the use of regression analysis should provide insight into any smaller, less obvious 
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potential demographic correlations (independent variables in this case) and the 
responses for each question.  Finally, I hope that my findings will contribute 
positively to the literature on public opinion. 
 
3.3 Observations Regarding Public Opinion and Drones 
 
 Of course, even with all of the research and arguments surrounding public 
opinion and foreign policy, the subject of this thesis, the drone program and public 
opinion, is relatively new.  This is not to say that the drone program itself is new, as 
was explained in the previous chapter, but the public’s knowledge about the 
program is still severely limited and, therefore, it would be safe to assume that 
opinions about the program are still consolidating.  Moreover, it is interesting to 
note that the survey from Monmouth University that found roughly 40% of 
Americans to still be in the dark about the program took place after President 
Obama’s speech defending the drone program at the National Defense University 
(Obama 2013), after he first admitted that U.S. drones killed 4 Americans in drone 
strikes (Savage and Baker 2013) and after John Brennan’s CIA Director 
confirmation hearing, which was highly publicized because of the fact that he was 
and is such a strong supporter of the drone program (his hearing was consistently 
interrupted by anti-drone activists not to mention a 13-hour filibuster by Sen. Rand 
Paul in which he demanded the White House confirm that it would not use a drone 
on U.S. soil to kill an American suspected of terrorism) (Finn and Blake 2013).  
Moreover, in an article titled “Media Coverage of the Drone Program”, Tara 
McKelvey explains that between 2009 and 2011, media coverage of the drone 
program was “relatively positive with only sporadic reporting on collateral damage” 
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(Mckelvey 2013: 11).  Yet after the drones strike on American-born radical cleric 
Anwar al-Awlaki on September 30, 2011 in Yemen, U.S. media began raising more 
critical questions about the program and coverage spiked over the next several 
months, prompting Obama to send John Brennan, then White House 
counterterrorism advisor, to give a speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center in which 
he outlined all the justifications for the U.S. targeted killing program and hailed its 
superior ability to neutralize terrorists (Brennan 2012).  Therefore, even though this 
program is still technically classified, recently there has been considerably more 
reporting of it and more official commentary clarifying its existence and the 
methods used.   
 
 There is no doubt that the number of Americans familiar with the program 
has grown day by day.  However, by hiding the program from scrutiny for so long, 
both Bush and Obama were able to mold a favorable narrative about a program that 
has been over a decade in the making.  Before critical pieces starting being 
published, the only time drones appeared in U.S. media was to show that another 
successful strike had occurred against Al-Qaeda operatives in some place like 
Yemen or Pakistan.  In fact, as Grant Cohen (2014: 22) explains in his report on 
“Public Opinion and Drones:” 
The analysis of NBC, ABC, CBS, CNN and FOX evening news 
stories about drones that appeared between 1/1/2000 and 1/1/2014 
yielded some revealing results…None of the 115 stories coded as 
“national security” frames offer debate or comment about issues 
related to the actual military success. Human rights and 
law/sovereignty frames do appear, but are most often featured 
following a major report from an NGO or human rights 
organization.  
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The national security frame is the predominant one with the law/sovereignty frame 
coming in a distant second with only 34 stories over the span of fourteen years 
(Cohen 2014: 18).2  Moreover, as Cohen points out, the ‘sources’ that U.S. media 
tend to use in stories about drones are individuals who are predominantly military 
or ex-government (almost always from the U.S. security apparatus, i.e. military, 
CIA, FBI), which are sources that would be less inclined to oppose or even slightly 
criticize the drone program (Cohen 2014: 24).  Finally, the drone program is 
something that, unlike many issues in today’s polarized political environment, 
enjoys broad bipartisan support (Ballhaus 2013).  It is natural, then, to see why the 
program enjoys such high overall public support.  In fact, current support for the 
drone program is hovering around 70%, the highest it has been in three years 
(Rasmussen Reports 2014).  
 
 It is not the intention of this work to argue for or against the drone program in 
its current state but some suggestions can be made.  There are strong, well-argued 
views on both sides, but as of now it appears that the public is satisfied, or even 
more than satisfied, with how the U.S. government operates its drone program.  
Although, again, this is not to say that a majority of the U.S. population has well-
informed ideas as to what exactly the program encompasses.  Critics of the program 
have seen their views expressed in the mainstream media within the past few years.  
Moreover, as previously mentioned, public opinion polls that, in some way or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!Note: this is out of a total of 248 broadcasts.!
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another, involve questions about the drone program are also a relatively recent 
development.   
 
 Before Brennan publicly acknowledged the program in 2012, it was a topic 
that most Americans devoted little time reflecting upon.  It is difficult to determine 
if or when the program will lose its popularity among the U.S. public.  As shown 
earlier, drones are not popular outside of the U.S. so there’s no reason why this 
could not become the case within the U.S. as well, but the reverse is also entirely 
possible. Moreover, foreign publics may generally hold unfavorable opinion of the 
U.S. overseas drone program (Fig 2), but between 2005 and 2011 the number of 
countries that had drones, armed and unarmed, rose from 41 to 76 (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO] 2012). Furthermore, now that the U.S. has relaxed its 
restrictions on the export of Category I Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS; Category 
I being drones that have an operational range of at least 300km and a payload of at 
least 500 kilos)(U.S. Department of State [USDS] 2015), U.S. allies and NATO 
members will likely start putting in bids for armed drones in an effort to create 
drone programs of their own (Australia announced it has already sent a handful of 
Australian airmen to be trained on the MQ-9 Reaper at Holloman Air Force Base in 
New Mexico) (Inside Defense 2015) 
 
 Any negative shift in U.S. opinion regarding military drones overseas is not 
likely to happen in the near future, even in the midst of increasing critical scrutiny.  
Drones allow the U.S. to continue counterterrorism operations in countries where a 
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government is essentially non-existent, without endangering any military personnel.  
Obviously, when the U.S. is able to cooperate with the intelligence services of 
another country it is very beneficial, but if this government collapses, as is currently 
the case in Yemen, U.S. drones are still able to operate regardless (there have been 
three, possibly four strikes in Yemen in 2015 already) (Serle 2015), something 
Obama made very clear in January (Beattle 2015). This does not imply that Special 
Operations Forces lack the ability to operate in this type of situation as well, but the 
risks of casualties are much higher.  In fact, aside from the operation on Bin 
Laden’s compound in 2011 and a handful of other either successful (i.e. Abu Anas 
al-Libi) or unsuccessful (i.e. Abdulkadir Mohamed) Special Operations capture/kill 
missions (Economist 2013), there have only been a total of 3 known attempts 
(Zenko 2014a) by U.S. forces to capture compared to over 200 attempts to kill. 
Covert cross-border capture operations have not been Obama’s preferred method of 
eliminating terrorists abroad; simply put, he would rather just kill them.  The U.S. 
public does not seem to oppose this method for now. 
 
 In conclusion, the public’s view of the drone program may be one that is not 
fully informed, but it is quite difficult to argue that a fully informed public would 
have a radically different opinion than the one that currently exists. More critical 
elements will continue to emerge as long as the U.S. drone program continues to be 
operated mostly or even in part by the CIA but it is impossible to know whether the 
public will ever oppose the idea of targeted killings by the U.S. government in 
general or those directed in particular by the CIA.  The polls that have been 
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administered regarding the drone program rarely mention the CIA as the operator, 
but there is no question as to whether or not the U.S. military will continue to 
develop and acquire drones.  It will be three years at the end of April 2015 since 
John Brennan publicly acknowledged America’s targeted killing program (Brennan 
2012).  Support has always remained over 50%, sometimes soaring over 70%.  It is 
difficult to speculate how the program will evolve over the next several years and if 
John Brennan will indeed follow through on his desire to shift the entirety of the 
CIA’s targeted killing program to the Pentagon, since the CIA has gotten very 
capable of killing the people it targets (Hirsch 2014). 
 
 What is more important is to try to determine how targeted killings with 
drones via the CIA and the increased reliance on drones by the military, especially 
the Air Force, for both intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions 
and strike missions, influence Americans’ perceptions of warfare.  One of the 
strongest critiques leveled against military drones, and the main research question 
in this thesis, is that drones can significantly lower the threshold for violence.  As 
Sarah Kreps and Micah Zenko (2014) argue,  
So far, the United States has had a relative monopoly over the use 
of such drones, but it cannot count on maintaining that for much 
longer...And although these new weapons will not transform the 
international system as fundamentally as did the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, they could still be used in 
ways that are highly destabilizing and deadly…Countries will not 
be deterred from launching drone attacks simply because an 
adversary has drones in its arsenal, too. If anything, the inherent 
advantages of drones -- most of all, not placing pilots or ground 
forces at risk of being killed or captured -- have lowered the 
threshold for the use of force. Spurred by the United States’ 
example, other countries are likely to threaten or conduct drone 
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strikes in ways that are harmful to U.S. interests, whether by 
provoking regional adversaries or targeting domestic enemies. 
This is something the U.S. needs to be very concerned with.  Although the drone 
revolution will not cause a complete change to the international system, as Kreps 
and Zenko stated, it has the potential to be very destructive.  The findings presented 
in the next section are only the beginning of what I hope can be a larger project in 
the future.  Although the sample size is small and the scope of the questions limited, 
the findings allow those interested in the subject of drone proliferation and its 
potential ramifications a bit of harder data to work with.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
 
 
 
4.1!Introduction!to!Survey!Findings!!! Americans are not more prone to use force than any other people on the 
planet.  When their interests are threatened or they perceive a threat, they respond 
accordingly, though not always correctly.  America’s leaders always attempt to take 
a rational, calculated approach; at least, that is how they defend their actions.  Yet, 
even ‘rational’ approaches can be wrong.  The 2003 invasion of Iraq represents a 
notable blunder by most popular and academic accounts and America continues to 
pay dearly for it, but the administration that authorized it managed to convince 
themselves, Congress and the American people that it was a rational, sensible 
undertaking.  There is no need to delve into the intricacies of the Iraq War and how 
an administration could get something so wrong (though, Irving Janis’ ‘groupthink’ 
(Janis 1972) model is rather convincing), I simply use it because it appears to be a 
timeless example of the need for forward thinking in the realm of U.S. foreign 
policy.   
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 The War on Terror has created an extreme need for quick and reliable 
intelligence like never before.  With ISR demand far outweighing supply, it is 
impossible for the U.S. to be everywhere all the time.  However, the U.S. does not 
need to be everywhere all the time; instead, drones can allow the U.S. to create a 
“dynamic presence” (See Fig 4), as Maj. Gen. John Shanahan, Commander, 25th 
Air Force, stated in his address to the Center for Strategic & International Studies 
(Shanahan 2014).  In his presentation, he goes on to explain that actually the current 
framework regarding remotely piloted aircraft allocation (RPAs), or drones, is:  
…much more about co-com ownership than it is about flexibility 
and agility.…it is, in fact, relatively inflexible. There is a different 
way of approaching the low supply, high demand problem.  Here 
the focus is on placement not allocation or ownership.  For now 
take drones as the ISR capability under consideration.  Dynamic 
presence would involve establishing a number of fixed global 
locations postured to accept RPAs on a reasonably short 
notice…there would be enormous benefits from this approach 
mostly manifested in the form of global agility.  It would enable 
rapid response on a truly global scale.  The ISR capabilities would 
not be everywhere all the time but instead could be anywhere when 
needed. 
 
Of course, MQ-9 Reapers certainly have the ability to carry out ISR missions but 
they are dynamic in themselves as they are both ‘hunters’ and ‘killers’.  These 
unmanned platforms can drastically reduce the amount of time, energy and 
resources that go into the counterterror doctrine of “find, fix and finish”, or ‘F3,’ 
(for more info on ‘F3’ see Peritz et al. 2012) as the drone can accomplish each of 
these three requirements on its own.  It is precisely this ability that worries critics of 
the drone program and why I chose to design a survey that would test the level of 
Americans’ willingness to intervene with regards to drones.  If the U.S. is in fact 
!! 48!
heading in the direction that was suggested by Maj. Gen. Shanahan, then it is 
essential that future research tries to understand two things:  First, we need to 
analyze whether or not the proliferation of drones in the U.S. military (including the 
CIA), as well as in foreign militaries, and the strategic shift towards ‘dynamic 
presence’, will indeed lower the threshold for violence for both state and non-state 
actors alike.  Second, and more relevant to this work, more polls need to be 
administered to the American public so that we may ascertain whether or not 
Americans are inclined to accept such a shift.  More specifically, has America’s 
drone program in some way desensitized Americans?  If so, what are the new 
boundaries Americans are willing to accept or will need to accept to continue the 
asymmetrical and now more dynamic War on Terror?  The findings from this 
survey offer one beginning to much needed future work.   
 
4.2 Survey Findings 
 
 Essentially, there are two ways to interpret these results.  The simple 
statistical analysis is different from the multiple regression analyses because with 
the simple statistics the response itself, along with the demographics, are the 
dependent variables while the independent variable is the actual addition (or 
increased reliance) of drones in questions 2, 4, and 6 that acts as the independent 
variable.  This allows us to observe any macro-level or micro-level changes 
between questions on the values of the dependent variables.  The questions were 
grouped in the following manner: Questions 1 & 2 (Group A), 3 & 4 (Group B), 
and 5 & 6 (Group C).   These three groups were designed in a way to be 
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representative of what should be considered essential categories (but not all 
categories) within the realm of military drones.  Group A represents the broadest, 
most vague condition, Group B is mission specific as well as relevant in real-time 
and Group C tests the humanitarian factor.  The thinking behind this is that while 
there is overall support for the use of drones, this support most likely varies 
depending on the scenario and not only the target itself.  While the explanatory 
power of the analyses may suffer since these three scenarios are being tested by 
only two questions each (rather than choosing to focus on only one scenario, which 
would allow me to generate a better data set for that scenario in particular), it must 
be understood that the choice to be broader in scope, therefore rendering the results 
less generalizable, was always the intent of this project; it is a stepping-stone 
towards a larger and, in my opinion, necessary project concerning drones, different 
scenarios and lethal action. 
  
 The results of the survey are more or less what I had expected.  The easiest 
and most straightforward way to observe any significant changes in the dependent 
variable was by grouping the questions, as mentioned above, and counting the total 
number of each Likert value chosen (V. Likely, Unlikely, Neutral etc).  The initial 
findings are interesting for a number of reasons.  First, in the interests of simplicity, 
one way to observe the data is by grouping the overall likelihood into two sections, 
which will be called “Positive Likelihood” and “Negative Likelihood”-- Positive 
Likelihood consists of “V. Likely, S. Likely and Likely” while Negative Likelihood 
encompasses the other end of the scale, “S. Unlikely, Unlikely, V. Unlikely.”  In 
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doing so, we can observe if a larger shift happens rather than small changes, which 
involves a tedious though not unimportant process, as we will observe (Groups A, B 
and C are presented respectively in Fig 6, 7 and 8).  Admittedly, the type of 
question posed in Group A was extremely broad and, therefore, probably a difficult 
to answer.  However, we observe that the responses to Question 1 produce an 
overall Positive Likelihood of 70% while Negative Likelihood is only 16%.  Yet, 
contrary to what I expected, when the type of military intervention shifts to ‘only 
drones’ in Question 2, Positive Likelihood decreases to 54% with Negative 
Likelihood increasing to around 30%.  Before this observation is further analyzed, 
the results of groups B and C must first be explained to better understand Group A’s 
outcome.   
 
 Group B’s responses represent more of what was expected.  The Positive 
Likelihood from Question 3 to Question 4 increased from 46% to 52.5% while the 
Negative Likelihood decreased from 39.5% to 31%.  Moreover, the percentage of 
those who chose ‘V. Likely’ rose over 10%, which represents the largest individual 
increase within Group B.  Group C also saw an increase in Positive Likelihood from 
65% to 72.5% between Question 5 and Question 6 with Negative Likelihood falling 
from 22% to 15%.  Again, here we see a positive increase in the choice of ‘V. 
Likely’ of over 15% from Question 5 to Question 6.   
 
These results, with the exception of Group A, are in line with my thesis that 
drones will increase the likelihood of support for military intervention, thus 
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lowering the threshold for violence.  Below is another graphic that shows the 
summed averages of responses within varying demographics (Average answer: 7-
very likely, 1 – very unlikely): 
Table!1:!Macro!Results!with!Demographics!!
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Total 
average 
(136 
people) 
5.1765 4.5294 3.9191 4.4118 4.7132 5.2279 
Male 
(55 people) 
5.6182 4.8000 4.6545 4.8545 4.8727 5.3455 
Female 
(81 people) 
4.8765 4.3457 3.4198 4.1111 4.6049 5.1481 
Age 20-50 
(28 people) 
3.7143 3.3571 2.2143 2.8571 4.0357 4.5714 
Age 51-70 
(80 people) 
5.5875 4.9500 4.3750 4.8750 4.9125 5.5375 
Age 71- 
(28 people) 
5.4643 4.5000 4.3214 4.6429 4.8214 5.0000 
Independent  
(24 people) 
3.6250 3.2500 2.2083 2.8333 4.1250 4.5000 
Democrats 
(25 people) 
5.3600 4.7600 3.8000 4.5600 4.7600 5.6400 
Republicans 
(62 people) 
5.5645 4.8548 4.5000 4.7903 4.8226 5.3709 
Tea Party 
(25 people) 
5.5200 4.7200 4.2400 4.8400 4.9600 5.1600 
High school 
(8 people) 
6.3750 5.7500 5.1250 5.8750 5.6250 6.1250 
Some 
College 
(23 people) 
5.1304 4.6522 4.0000 4.9130 5.3913 5.2174 
College 
Graduate 
(39 people) 
5.2308 4.6410 3.6923 4.2301 4.3077 5.1026 
Some post-
graduate 
(9 people) 
5.5556 4.2222 4.7778 4.2222 5.0000 5.5556 
Post 
graduate 
(57 people) 
4.9298 4.2807 3.7368 4.1579 4.5439 5.1403 
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Again, the sample size when spilt into different variables is small but not without 
interest.  One of the interesting observations here is that those who fall into the age 
range of 20-50 offer some of the lowest support (least likely) in regards to all the 
questions; however, they too are susceptible to increase their support if we look at 
their shifts from Question 3 to Question 4 and Question 5 to Question 6.  A good 
supplemental study that was done by YouGov.com, especially in regards to age, 
also shows that the younger the age group the less likely one is to support drones 
(Fig 5).  Another result that is in line with prior polling research is that women are 
less likely to support the use of drones.  A study by the Pew Research Center found 
women’s approval of U.S. drone strikes to be at 44% while men’s was almost at 
70% (PRC 2013).  Therefore, although women did increase their likelihood for 
support between questions in Groups B and C, their average overall support was 
lower than that of men’s.  Those who chose to identify as Independent supported 
using drones the absolute least, but even this group was not immune to at least 
increasing their likelihood to support intervention when drones were added to the 
“interventions” in questions 4 and 6.  
 
 Furthermore, it appears as though Democrats are most susceptible to increase 
their likelihood of support when drones are added with the shift in their responses 
increasing by almost one whole interval from questions 3 to 4 and 5 to 6.  
Moreover, in the next table we see that in terms of those who strongly identified 
with their party’s ideals, ‘strong’ Democrats were the most likely to support any of 
the suggested interventions and were the most susceptible to increase their 
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likelihood of support when drones were added in questions 4 and 6.  In comparison, 
those who ‘strongly’ identified within the Tea Party and Republican Party were less 
susceptible.  For Republicans, it made almost no difference whether or not drones 
were used in the case of intervening in Iraq in questions 3 and 4.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are a number of possible reasons as to why Democrats who strongly identify 
with their party would offer the most support to intervention when it involves the 
use of drones.  Perhaps it is simply because they strongly support their president 
and tactics he has chosen to fight with, especially the drone program.  Therefore, 
they associate drones with a successful counter-terrorism policy, which translates 
into more support for drones and operations that rely on them.  This logic could also 
be used to explain why those who strongly identify with the Republican Party and 
the Tea Party are not as susceptible to the drone variable in the questions, as 
increased support could be interpreted as giving tacit support to the Obama 
administration’s drone program.  Partisan politics in the U.S. make it unlikely for 
either side to credit those across the aisle for anything. For now, it is enough to 
understand that there may be a significant difference.  To answer the question as to 
Table!2:!Strong!Ideological!Identification!!
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 
Tea Party  
(strong)+* 
(23 people) 
5.3913 4.5217 4.1739 4.7391 4.9565 5.0435 
Republicans  
(strong)+* 
(47 people) 
5.7234 4.8936 4.8511 4.8936 5.0638 5.6170 
Democrats  
(strong)+* 
(16 people) 
6.1250 5.4375 4.8125 5.6875 5.1875 6.3125 
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why strong Democrats are more susceptible and the others less would require more 
research and more polling.   
  
 Multiple regression analysis (MRA) was used to test the explanatory strength 
of this model of questioning and look for important distinctions between variables.  
In order to find any potential correlation between the independent variables, the 
demographics, and the dependent variable, the likelihood of support, the following 
formula was used (Note: race and gender are not shown because they were 
insignificant for this MRA):  
 
y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2+ β3X3 
y = likelihood of support (1-7) 
β0 = intercept 
β1, β2, β3 = marginal effect of X1, X2, X3 respectively on y 
X1 = Age 
X2 = Education 
X3 = Political Affiliation 
 
As expected as a limitation, the explanatory power of this model, or R2, is very low 
due to small sample size.  However, this does not necessarily mean that this MRA is 
without worth. Some questions did produce somewhat more decisive results.  For 
example, Question 3 produced an R2 of almost 30%, which means this particular 
model can explain 30% of the variability in the response data to this question, with 
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most of the influence coming from the political variable, age playing a smaller role, 
and education being insignificant.  Although the R2 in Question 4 is lower, it is still 
obvious that the political variable has the most impact, with age slightly impacting 
the outcome of the question.  So, while there is not a strong connection with age 
and education, there is a very strong connection with political affiliation.  This 
connection is positive (1 – other, 2 – independent, 3 – democrat, 4 – republican, 5 – 
tea party). Ergo, the higher this variable, the higher the probability for supporting 
drones.  While this is good to know, the real benefit of this MRA comes from 
comparing the models between and within the groups.   
 
 For example, education is the only variable to have an inverse relationship.  
The more educated someone is, the less likely they are to answering any of the 
questions in this survey positively.  Yet, if we compare the significance and 
marginal effect (Beta) of education between questions 1 and 2, we see that that both 
the significance and Beta values increase in question 2 where drones have been 
added.  This occurs again when comparing questions 3 to 4.  In Question 3 
education is essentially totally insignificant and its Beta value non-existent, but in 
Question 4 its significance as well as its Beta value greatly increase.  Since the only 
difference between questions is the advent of drones, this data results in the 
assumption that the more educated an individual, the less likely he/she is to support 
the use of drones.  
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The simple statistics and MRAs allow for many insights and, most importantly, 
provide this project with a basis for the claim that drones may decrease the 
threshold for lethal violence depending on the scenario.  As is shown in Group A, 
when the scenario is broad and vague, there seems to be less support to intervene 
with just drones, but when the mission becomes more specific (Group B) or 
specifically humanitarian (Group C) drones increase support for intervention and 
not just on a macro scale, but across the smaller demographic variables as well.  
The data shows that, in line with other studies, women are less likely to support a 
more specific form of intervention with drones, but are still susceptible to increase 
their support for an intervention that would rely either heavily or solely on drones 
when compared to one that would not.  Moreover, this survey and the survey from 
YouGov (Fig. 7) point to a trend for younger people to be less supportive of drones, 
a distinction that warrants further research.  These preliminary findings are useful, 
interesting and leave this project with a lot of potential for expansion.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 The War on Terror will never end.  The current international climate is more 
than hostile: Russian aggression has yet to meet any real counter-response from 
Europe or the U.S., ISIS will most likely plague the Middle East for years to come, 
Syria remains in hopeless chaos, Iraq does not look much better, Yemen is 
threatening to dissolve into something like Syria, and Israel and America currently 
have a chilly relationship.  However, the biggest threat to the American people 
remains extremism as well as how America continues to combat it.  
 
 Although the number of drone strikes carried out under the U.S. targeted 
killing program has decreased (see figure 9 and 10) we can see just how critical 
drones are for the U.S. military, not just the CIA.  Although the U.S. does not say 
which of the airstrikes have been carried out by drones, it is safe to assume that any 
U.S airstrikes inside Syria are probably done by drones, due to the Syria’s air 
defense capabilities as evidenced by the downing of a U.S. surveillance drone by 
Syrian forces in March (Stewart and Karouny 2015).  Drones are certainly used to 
carry out strikes in Iraq as well, but again, exact numbers are not known.  Because 
of their ability to stay aloft for over 10 hours, these drones are critical for tracking 
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movements of all the various factions operating within this area (e.g. a U.S. strike 
last year against the al-Qaeda linked group, Khorasan, inside Syria) (Hosenball and 
Stewart 2014).  Moreover, in regards to the Saudi-led air campaign in Yemen, one 
can be sure that much of the logistical and intelligence support the U.S. is giving the 
Saudis is coming from U.S. surveillance drones.  The ability of U.S. military drones 
to operate in these areas and, as witnessed, get shot down with essentially no 
repercussions is a considerable luxury enjoyed by President Obama. Syria, Iraq and 
Yemen represent complex, multifaceted proxy war battlefields and the farther the 
U.S. can keep its service men and women away, the better.  Until a certain threat 
threshold is crossed (and it may never be), President Obama and his National 
Security Council would rather rely on robots and supersonic aircraft to try and 
control these situations. 
 
 America would do well to establish a ‘dynamic presence’ around the globe 
and unmanned aerial technology will play an enormous role.  However, America 
and Americans must first come to the realization that although the United States 
remains the leader of the drone regime, its monopoly is quickly diminishing.  As the 
default forerunner and leader, the U.S. is the most heavily accountable for the 
precedents that it sets regarding the use of militarized drones overseas.  When 
drones are used by the U.S. military, the actions of their pilots and those who 
command them are governed by certain Rules of Engagement (ROE), U.S. military 
law, and the Geneva Convention signed by the U.S. regarding warfare.  Yet, the 
lack of transparency surrounding the targeted killing program by the CIA and JSOC 
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makes it impossible to establish any real precedent.  Are U.S. allies also allowed to 
run targeted killing programs with drones overseas?  What if Russia decides it 
needs to set up a fixed drone hub in Cuba, for example, citing security concerns?  
These questions and many more remain unanswered. 
 
 In the new export policy regarding drones (UAS, UAVs, RPAs etc.) outlined 
by the U.S. Department of State (USDS 2015), those countries deemed eligible to 
receive armed drones must agree to adhere to these four principles:  
 
(1) Recipients are to use these systems in accordance with 
international law, including international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law, as applicable; (2) Armed and other 
advanced UAS are to be used in operations involving the use of 
force only when there is a lawful basis for use of force under 
international law, such as national self-defense; (3) Recipients are 
not to use military UAS to conduct unlawful surveillance or use 
unlawful force against their domestic populations; and (4) As 
appropriate, recipients shall provide UAS operators technical and 
doctrinal training on the use of these systems to reduce the risk of 
unintended injury or damage. 
 
These principles are broad and vague, but only because the U.S. is not prepared to 
make them specific enough to the CIA and JSOC under more scrutiny than they 
would desire.  Practically speaking, the U.S. State Department realizes that it cannot 
afford to appear hypocritical.  As Micah Zenko (2015: 4) stated in his piece in 
Foreign Policy: 
Subsequently, it [the U.S.] has a unique opportunity and 
responsibility to not only set precedents for the use of armed 
drones, but to determine which countries might acquire these 
systems and hold them accountable for their use.  What is 
unfortunate about the new policy [on exporting drones] is the 
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principles that it claims countries must follow before the United 
States will authorize the transfer of military drones….Even analysts 
less skeptical than me would ask if the United States itself adheres 
to these principles. Most notably, the United States does not say 
when international humanitarian law and/or international human 
rights law applies to which of its drone strikes. Christof Heyns, 
U.N. special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary 
executions, suggested in his 2013 report that countries should work 
collectively to determine how international law applies to the use of 
drones, and that armed drone states that invoke the right to self-
defense — as the United States does — should submit a report to 
the Security Council for each country in which they use force. The 
United States has not yet done either…Based on the new policy, it 
would be difficult to justify selling military drones to the United 
States itself, given that the Obama administration has never 
provided the transparency or clarity to know if it is adhering to the 
principles that it now asks of potential recipient countries. 
 
     
The United States – but more specifically the Obama administration – has assumed 
a “just trust us” approach to the issue, which seems to be accepted by the American 
public.  There is nothing wrong with trusting one’s government (to a certain extent), 
but the U.S. is not asking only its citizens to ‘trust it’ but rather that, every person, 
anywhere that extremist targets exist, must accept U.S. targeted killings.  This 
stance is shortsighted, dangerous and simply not acceptable if the U.S. considers 
itself a world leader.  Moreover, as my results suggest (and as larger future studies 
hopefully may show) these drones RPAs, UAVs, UAS etc. have the potential to, in 
fact, lower the threshold for violence on a global scale.  In its defense, there have 
been vast benefits gained by the U.S. from its targeted killing program, and, to 
some extent, this targeted killing program conducted by the CIA and JSOC has 
done much to decimate Al-Qaeda and its affiliates’ operations throughout the globe.  
I agree that the U.S. military should implement the use of more drones on the 
battlefield and for ISR.  However, as drones become more widely used and widely 
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available, especially armed drones, the nature of warfare is likely to change, as well 
as how it is perceived, and the U.S. needs to adopt an approach that does not make 
drone strikes continue to seem arbitrary or haphazard as this risks decreasing 
reliance on non-lethal approaches to counterterrorism that can be much more 
beneficial than simply neutralizing a target.   
 
 However, in the absence of public pressure, it is unlikely that the current 
narrative of support will change.  There have been many instances in the past where 
the U.S. public has prompted the U.S. government and military forces to implement 
measures that better protect civilian life, but this has not yet been the case with the 
targeted killing program.  There thus appears to be a disconnect here on some level, 
because every poll administered regarding drones strikes and the risk of civilian 
casualties shows that Americans are much less likely to support a drone attack if 
civilian lives are threatened.  As political scientist James Walsh explains in an 
experiment he tested in 2012, “respondents attach as much or more value on the 
lives of foreign civilians as they do on U.S. military personnel"(Sides 2013).  
However, in his own work (Walsh 2013: 18), he goes on to state that “This specific 
result should not be over-emphasized…the public may be more likely to express 
disapproval in hypothetical situations than in response to actual attacks by the 
United States.”  The latter part of this statement seems to hold more truth in this 
case than the actual “agreement in public opinion” that civilian casualties are bad 
and should be minimalized.   
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 However, it is also possible that the Obama administration itself has 
recognized the potential danger in continuing to carry out unlimited drone strikes 
against targets in Pakistan and Yemen, which is perhaps why they have decreased 
in frequency (Fig 9 and Fig 10).  There are a number of possible reasons for this 
decrease (this not to say that drone strikes in these areas have dwindled to nothing; 
moreover there have been an unprecedented series of drone strikes in Somalia (BIJ 
2015) since the beginning of the year), but one explanation could be that Obama 
understood that the targeted killing program could not be kept from public view 
forever.   Ergo, he decided to start toning down the program by removing the 
practice of “signature strikes” and tightening the criteria that needed to be met 
before a strike could be authorized in order to minimize civilian casualties.  This 
way, when public interest in the program increased (as it did before, during and 
after Brennan’s CIA confirmation) there would be fewer recent strikes to account 
for and less of a chance that one of the strikes could have been botched (luckily for 
Brennan, the aforementioned strike that killed many civilians in a wedding convoy 
in Yemen didn’t take place until many months after he got confirmed)(Almasmari 
2013b).  Moreover, just recently in March it was made public that the man 
responsible for hunting bin Laden as well as directly supervising the CIA’s drone 
program as head of the CTC was removed from this post as part of a “major 
reorganization under CIA director John Brennan”(Miller 2015).   
 It is clear that civilian casualties were something that the administration was 
concerned about, as in, concerned that the actual number of civilian deaths might 
not sit well with the American public.  For example, one of the most astounding 
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statements regarding the drone targeted killing program was Brennan’s statement in 
June 2011 that no civilians had been killed in drone strikes in almost a year, which 
according to leaked documents is simply not true (Serle and Woods 2013).  Even 
less convincing is the contention that the targeted killing program has, according to 
the Obama administration, generally been responsible for “no” or “single-digit” 
civilian casualties (Pilkington 2013) While the actual number of civilian deaths will 
never be agreed upon, as stated earlier, it certainly pushes the limits of reason to 
truly believe that civilian causalities have been in the single digits.  Yet, Obama is 
neither deaf nor blind when it comes to public opinion and in the wake of media 
attention given to the targeted killing program in early 2013, he and Brennan most 
likely chose to espouse an unrealistic representation of civilian causalities rather 
than admit to an unacceptable number (not sure what that number would be) and 
risk public disapproval and demand for more transparency.  
 
 The age of remote warfare has arrived without an existing legal and political 
framework governing the use of drones.  There are many who argue that there is 
relatively little difference between a drone and a fighter jet when it comes utilizing 
both in a combat situation, because the manner in which a target is killed is 
essentially the same.  There are only a few very positive differences: (a) there is no 
pilot in a drone but that is a good thing because it keeps its personnel safer, (b) 
drones can remain in the air for up to 14 hours, thus allowing for an exponential 
increase in ISR capabilities and quick reaction/support capabilities, and (c) they are 
significantly cheaper to operate than traditional manned aircraft.  Yet, while drones 
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may operate in a manner similar to manned aircraft, their very nature is creating a 
fundamental difference in warfare.  As this thesis has hinted at and as future studies 
may further prove, drones can lower the threshold for violence/military 
intervention, even more so in the case of the U.S. targeted killing program.  More 
importantly, the use of drones apparently increases the willingness of the American 
public to intervene militarily in a situation.  Drones are an exceptional asset for any 
military or intelligence organization, but the U.S. and the CIA may need to 
reconsider whether or not to continue using them in such an unrestricted manner. 
 
 Finally, we cannot fully at present ascertain empirically whether or not 
unmanned systems, drones in particular, have the potential to lower the threshold 
for violence.  Although these preliminary findings suggest why they might, only 
through the creation of a massive database, which monitors lethal actions carried 
out via unmanned systems on a global scale, would researchers and analysts be able 
to observe if such lethal action were on the rise.  The scope of this concept is broad 
and the amount of data and analysis required to develop and maintain something of 
this nature would be immense.  Yet, as presented in this thesis, there are already a 
handful of organizations that have successfully been able to accurately follow many 
of the targeted killings carried out by the U.S. (Long War Journal, The Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism, etc).   However, other countries are rapidly developing 
their own armed drone capabilities (Pakistan recently unveiled its first armed drone 
in March)(Varandani 2015).  I believe that, through the existing mechanisms for 
tracking drone strikes, combined with the continued rigorous work by investigative 
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journalists and the increasing abilities of statisticians to process meta-data in this 
rapidly advancing technological era, such a project is possible.  If not for anything 
other reason, the use of lethal unmanned technology should cause us to try and 
understand how willing humans are to use it. 
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Figure 1. Casualty Estimates  
Figure 2. Pew Research Poll  
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Figure 3. Sample Survey 
Source: Pew Research Center 2014  
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1.  If the United States were to enter into a military conflict in the future, how likely would you be to 
support this engagement if there were a heavy reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) rather 
than U.S. soldiers thus decreasing the likely number of U.S. casualties? 
 
V. Likely    Likely     Somewhat likely      Neutral      Somewhat Unlikely    Unlikely        V.Unlikely 
  
      ☐                 ☐                     ☐                       ☐                          ☐                       ☐                      ☐   
 
 
 
2.  How likely would you be to support this engagement if only aerial drones—no U.S. soldiers—
were involved? 
 
V. Likely    Likely     Somewhat likely     Neutral     Somewhat unlikely       Unlikely        V.Unlikely 
 
      ☐            ☐                      ☐                ☐                         ☐                        ☐          ☐ 
 
 
 
3.  How likely would you be at this moment to support direct U.S. combat operations in Iraq where 
U.S. soldiers would be put at risk?   
 
V. Likely    Likely     Somewhat likely     Neutral     Somewhat unlikely       Unlikely       V. Unlikely 
 
  ☐               ☐       ☐           ☐                     ☐                 ☐         ☐   
  
 
 
4.  How likely would you be to support military engagement in Iraq if only drones—no U.S. 
soldiers—were involved? 
 
V. Likely    Likely     Somewhat likely     Neutral     Somewhat unlikely       Unlikely       V. Unlikely 
 
   ☐               ☐          ☐                ☐                  ☐                           ☐          ☐ 
   
 
 
5.  In the event of a humanitarian crisis in another country where the possibility of genocide exists, 
how likely would you be to support sending U.S. troops to contain the situation? 
 
V. Likely    Likely     Somewhat likely     Neutral     Somewhat unlikely       Unlikely       V, Unlikely 
 
          ☐      ☐                  ☐                         ☐                   ☐                              ☐           ☐ 
   
6.  In the event of a humanitarian crisis in another country where the possibility of genocide exists, 
how likely would you be to support U.S. intervention to contain the situation if drones could 
effectively be used, thus decreasing the likely number of U.S. troop causalities? 
 
V. Likely    Likely     Somewhat likely     Neutral     Somewhat unlikely       Unlikely       V. Unlikely 
              
         ☐            ☐              ☐         ☐                       ☐                              ☐        ☐ 
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Demographics (Check all that apply) 
 
 
 
7.  What is your gender? 
 
Male          Female 
 ☐              ☐ 
 
 
8.  What is your race? 
 
 
White/Caucasian  Hispanic/Latin American   Black/African-American   Asian-Am.  Am. Indian 
           ☐                                ☐            ☐                             ☐                   ☐    
 
       Other 
 
          ☐   Could you specify? __________________ 
 
 
9.  What is your Age? _________  
 
 
 
10.  With which political party are you affiliated (if any)? 
 
Republican               Tea-Party                  Democrat      Independent        
        ☐                        ☐                 ☐                     ☐ 
  
       Other 
 
           ☐   Could you specify? __________________ 
 
 
11.  From the party you chose, how strongly do you identify with its principles and ideology? 
 
 
V. Strongly   Strongly   Somewhat strongly      Neutral    Somewhat weakly   Weakly      V. Weakly 
 
        ☐                ☐                    ☐                          ☐                      ☐ ☐                  ☐ 
  
 
12.  What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 
Some High School           High School                           Some College 
 
         ☐                                     ☐                           ☐ 
 
College Graduate      Some post-graduate work       Post-graduate degree 
         ☐                                      ☐                                               ☐ 
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Figure 4. Dynamic Presence 
 !! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Source: Maj. Gen Shanahan, CSIS Remarks  
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Figure 5: Survey Responses to Questions 1 & 2  
Figure 6: Survey Responses to Questions 3 & 4 
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Figure 7. Survey Responses to Questions 5 & 6 
Figure 8. YouGov Poll  
Source: YouGov 2013 !
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Source: Bill Roggio 2015a  
Source: Bill Roggio 2015b 
Figure 9. Total Airstrikes in Yemen 
Figure 10. Total Airstrikes in Pakistan 
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